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Abstract 
The study intends to investigate the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
dividend policy in Pakistan.  The sample of the study covers Karachi Stock Exchange 100 index 
listed companies from the period of 2008 to 2011. The results have confirmed the support of 
outcome model in Pakistan which confirms that firm’s dividend policy moves with the direction of 
corporate governance quality. Moreover, there are positive associations between size of the firms, 
profitability and dividend policy. Finally, investment opportunities and leverage are negatively 
related with dividend policy. These results, taken as a whole, indicate that better governed firms 
used to pay more dividends and it implies that firm-level corporate governance and country-level 
investor protections are complements to each other rather than substitution.   
Keywords: Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance, Karachi Stock Exchange and Agency 
Theory.        
Introduction 
The policy of paying dividend is an astounding riddle of corporate finance. Numerous 
studies have been carried out to resolve this mystery, but still it is inconclusive. It is normally 
considered to be as “Dividend puzzle” which is still unresolved (Black, 1976). Additionally, Brealey 
& Myers (2005) discovered that the dividend is one of the top ten vital unresolved problems of the 
corporate finance. After no trail off  more than three decades, the situation is still baffling, much 
more empirical and theoretical researches are deemed  to develop a universal consenses on the 
dividend policy (Allen & Michaely, 2003). Differenrt theories have been proposed by researchers to 
address the corporate dividend behavior but the questions are still unanswered why firms use to pay 
dividends.   
In this regard, agency theory has proposed the most promising framework. According to 
agency theory, managers use to exploit cash flows of the company for their own ends even at the 
cost of external shareholders (Jensen, 1986). By disgorging free cash flows in the favor of external 
shareholders and exposing firm to capital market through fund raising, the problem of agency cost 
can be cater (Easterbrook, 1984). The relative success of the agency cost  explanation for dividends 
may result from the fact that it relates a firm’s corporate governance to its dividend policy.  
The agency theory has provided a solid platform for researchers to investigate the 
relationship between the dividend policy and corporate governance.  The ongoing endeavor  of 
researches has proposed two set of opposing hypotheses to explain the role of corporate governance 
in determining dividend policy. First, the outcome model proposes that better governed firms should 
have to pay higher dividends by pursing shareholders rights (La Porta et al., 2000).  On the other 
hand, substitution hypothesis narrates that dividends are the substitution for Governance quality and 
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weak governed firms use to pay higher dividend in order to establish good repute in the market 
(Jiraporn & Ning, 2006).  
This study intendes to investigate the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
dividend policy in Pakistan. How corporate governance quality affects the decision of dividend 
payments in Pakistan. The Pakistan’s capital market offers an interesting setting, in which to explore 
this issue, deemed relevant for several grouds. During last few years the corporate regulatory bodies 
have taken some encouraging moves to improve the level of corporate governance in Pakistan. The 
Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has launched the framework of corporate 
governance practices and bound the listed companies should be   operated  in compliance with best 
practices of corporate governance and in exercise of the powers granted by sub-section (4) of section 
34 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969). It was a staggering move in the 
endeavor of corporate governance improvement in Pakistan with the establishment of “Pakistan 
Institute of Corporate Governance” in December 2004. The institution has taken a charge to develop 
a platform which can  improve the mechanism of corporate governance practices in Pakistan.  
Second,  the corporate ownership in Pakistan with its high level of ownership concentration 
and the frequent use of dual class shares not only gerenates the confilict of interest between internal 
and external shareholders but also leads to expropriations of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders. The corporate vigilance and shareholders right protections are very feeble in Pakistan 
and only block holders of having more than 20% shareholdings can pursue to court for their 
dividend infringement right while the minorities shareholders the real victims just can complain to 
SECP  for not paying dividends by the company (Afzal & Sehrish, 2010).  So, keeping in view the 
weak corporate environment and low shareholders right protections, the study intends to investigate 
the role of corporate governance in forming the corporate dividend policy of company in Pakistan. 
The rest of the paper has been organized into four sections. The literature review, empirical 
methodology and selection of variables have been discussed in section 2 and 3 respectively. The 
detailed discussion about results has been covered into section 4 while in the last section conclusion 
has been drawn from the empirical results. 
Literature Review 
In existing literature, the researchers have tried to study the different dimensions of dividend 
policy in order to answer the question, why firms use to pay dividends. But still the picture is cloudy 
and plenty of work required making it clear. Most of the scholars have argued that paying dividend 
is an important tool to resolve the issue of information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) further explained the role of dividends soften up the agency 
problems between corporate insiders and shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) argued that 
dividend payments reduce the amount of free cash flows available at the disposal of managers to 
exploit it for their own ends. In line with that, Jensen (1986) revealed that managers use to invest the 
free cash flows in negative net present values projects for their personal benefits, paying dividends 
reduce the propensity of managers to exploit the free cash flows of company. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) established that paying dividends force the firms to expose in primary markets for funds 
collections to finance its projects. The external funds providers like; investment banks, security 
exchanges, and capital suppliers will frequently monitor the operations of firms who in turn may 
introduce corporate governance practices.  
La Porta, (2002)  introduced the two models of agency costs and dividend payments. First, 
according to the outcome model dividends are being paid, because shareholders force the managers 
to distribute cash flows as dividends. It implies that more the firm is better governed, higher the 
level of dividend payments. The substitution model reveals that the firms with weak corporate 
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governance use to pay more dividends in order to establish a reputation for not exploiting 
shareholders. In line with that, Mitton, (2004) cross country analyses of 19 countries proposed that 
there is positive relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance. Hence, corporate 
governance is power of minority shareholders in the company to safeguard from potential 
expropriation of firm’s managers. 
Burkart and Fausto (2001) elaborated the consequences of weak minority shareholders 
protections. The agency problems become severe and owner–managers have a strong preference for 
control and do not encourage dividend payments. Jiraporn and Ning (2006) also confirmed the 
support of substitution model and establish that weakly governed firms use to pay high dividends in 
America.  But, John and Knyazeva (2006), concluded that dividend payout decreases in better 
governed firms because there are less chances of exploitations. There is also the negative 
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance. They also find that, in firms facing 
high agency costs, corporate governance plays a more crucial role than dividends. 
In the realm of governance issues probing, few local scholars have also contributed. 
Different dimensions of corporate governance have been investigated like concentration of 
ownerships lead to low dividends payments (Maher, 2002). Managerial ownership and individual 
ownership are the most significant determinants of dividend behavior (Afza & Hassan, 2010). These 
studies just have included the preliminary components of corporate governance still plenty of others 
are unvisited. Particularly, this study has been designed to properly probe the impact of corporate 
governance on dividend payment decision. In existing local studies, few dimensions of corporate 
governance have been investigated like; concentration of ownership and managerial ownership 
(Maher, 2002; Afzal & Hassan, 2010). A comprehensive index of corporate governance quality 
containing three main dimensions and further nine sub-dimensions has been administered at firm 
level  (Sawicki, 2009).                 
The existing body of literature is inconclusive about the relationship between dividend policy 
and corporate governance. On the one hand, the studies are supporting the outcome model in such a 
way that better governed firms use to pay high dividend it means there is a positive relationship 
between dividend policy and corporate governance.  One the other hand, there is also the notion of 
substitution model which implies that dividends are the substitutions of corporate governance 
quality. However, designing dividend policy becomes crucial when corporate governance is weak, 
which in turn implies a negative relationship between dividend and corporate governance. Due to 
the inconclusive nature of existing body of literature, this study aims to investigate the nature of 
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance quality in Pakistan.  
Methodology 
Sample 
The initial sample of the study is 100 companies covering in Karachi Stock Exchange 100 
index. All of the companies are mature and leaders of its respective sectors in terms of market 
capitalization. The sample period of the study ranges from 2008 to 2011. The sample size enclose 
companies are profitable and dividend payers at least three years during the sample period. The 
filtration process has reduced the sample size up to 74 companies (Afzal & Sehrish, 2010). All the 
data have been extracted from the annual reports published by sample companies. 
Corporate Governance Measures 
The Corporate governance index is the proxy of corporate governance quality of Pakistani 
firms. It has been constructed by using dichotomous criteria. There are the three main dimensions of 
corporate governance index which have been used in this study like; board of directors, audit 
committee and nomination & remuneration committee following Sawicki, (2009) pattern. These 
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three dimensions have further nine sub-dimensions which are rated on yes/no criteria by assigning 
one point to yes criteria and zero to no criteria. It implies that more the points a company has better 
the corporate governance is.  In Pakistan, most of the businesses are family owned and managed by 
family members who are substantially effecting the strategic decisions. So, family concentration as a 
fourth dimension has been included in corporate governance index. 
A  model of  five  independent variables like; the profitability, market- to- book value ratio, 
corporate governance index, leverage ,size of firm  and one dependent variable dividend payout 
ratio has made use of in this study. All these variables are also the determinants of the dividend 
policy. These variables have also been stressed in various studies and in every investigation the 
importance of the variables envisaged in different ways. The dividend payout ratio is the proxy of 
dividend policy. It has been calculated as dividend per share divided by the earning per share 
(Ahmed & Javad, 2009). The Market-to-book value is the proxy of the growth opportunities. It has a 
negative impact on the dividend policy because firms prefer to avoid transaction costs due to 
external financing and retained a greater proportion of the cash if they have opportunities to grow 
(Li Lin & Hua, 2012). Holder et al. (1998) suggest that large firms should have better access to 
external capital markets and less dependency on internal funds to finance their investment projects. 
Therefore, large firms should be more likely than small ones to pay dividends to their shareholders. 
A firm with large size has easy access to the market and to explore opportunities properly. (Jiraporn 
& Ning, 2006).  
The profitability is an important determinant of the dividend policy. The profitable firms 
with stable net earnings could afford more dividend than take of the low profitable firms. (Ahmed & 
Javad, 2009).  The total liabilities to total assets are considered a measure of a firm’s financial 
leverage and expected to have negative relationship with payout policy (Afza & Hassan, 2010) . 
Table 1: Variable Description 
Variable                                              Description Expected Sign 
Dividend Payout  Common dividends /(net income – preferred dividends)  
Profitability     Earning Per Share + 
Growth Opportunities     Market Book Value Ratio +/- 
Leverage        Total liabilities to Total assets Ratio - 
Corporate Governance    Corporate Governance Index +/- 
Size Log of total assets + 
In order to analyze the impact of corporate governance and control variables on dividend 
policy formulation a model has been developed. The OLS regression estimate has been used to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy. 
(DP)it =α 0 + β1(CGI)it + β2 (PROFIT)it+ β3(MBV)it+ β4(SIZE)it +β5(LEV)it +εit    (1) 
Additionally, nonlinear regression has also been used to probe the impact of corporate 
governance on dividend policy. In most of the existing studies, linear regressions such as; OLS, 
fixed effect and random effect have been used by considering the response and explanatory 
variables observed.   Paying dividend is a discrete phenomena which switches between initiation or 
omission. For example, most of the firms do not pay dividend in that case response variable is 
unobserved while explanatory variables are observed. In case of censored sample, tobit regression 
model is a suitable approach. The structure equation of random tobit regression is as follow. 
Yi = βi Xi + ui                     (2) 
Where:  Yi is the latent dependent variable while Xi is the vector of all explanatory variables 
and βi is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.      
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Results 
Table 2 shows the results of the descriptive statistics of all variables. The corporate 
governance is an important variable of the study which made use of measuring the strength of the 
shareholders right; the high value of the index represents the high corporate governance quality 
while low value of index is the representation of low corporate governance quality. The average 
value of the index is 6.28 which is showing that, the governance standard in Pakistan is improving 
and most of the companies are considering good governing firms. The accumulation of more points 
in the corporate governance index is the sign of proper implementation of corporate governance 
standards so, more than 50% is a positive indication (Sawicki, 2009). The study has used one 
measure of dividend policy the payout ratio, the results are showing that on average the companies 
in Pakistan, use to pay more than fifty percent of its income as dividend to shareholders.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DP 52.448068 33.5543346 .0000 171.0000 
EPS 20.719735 25.2670745 -6.3100 122.6700 
MBV 2.614744 3.4196435 .4500 23.5000 
LEV .508765 .2607701 .0700 .9800 
SIZE  10.076737 1.5518561 6.4922 13.9549 
CGI 6.28 1.152 2 8 
DP is cash dividend over earnings. MBV is market to book value. LEVERGE is total debt to total 
asset. EPS is earnings per share equity. TOTAL ASSETS is book value of total assets. CGI is 
multifactor corporate governance Index.  
The mean of leverage is .508, represents that on average, firms use to finance its operations 
through the use of external debts. The profitability of firms has been gauged through EPS, on 
average firms are earning at the rate of Rs 20 but the high level of standard deviation approx 26 
represents that there is the high level of varying degrees of earnings with respect to firms.   
In order to measure the size of the firm log of total assets has been used because the dividend 
policy of firm varies with the size of the firm. Big firms use to pay more dividends as compare to 
small firms. The mean of total assets 10.07, shows that more firms are big firms in the sample of the 
study. The investment opportunities for firms have been proxy by market price of the firm with 
respect to book value of equity per share. The results of descriptive statistics reveal that on average 
all the firms in sample have substantial positive opportunities to invest.  
The problem of multicollinearity is obvious in secondary data and most of the time it leads 
toward wrong estimations. It is deemed relevant to soften up the problem of multicollinearity by 
applying Variance Inflation Factor and Correlations tests.    
Table 3: Variance inflation Factors for Explanatory Variables   
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
EPS .894 1.118 
MBV .868 1.152 
LEV .682 1.467 
SIZE  .591 1.691 
CGI .808 1.238 
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Table 3 shows the results of variance inflation factors for explanatory variables. The VIF 
level of all the variables is less than threshold level. This indicates that the explanatory variables are 
not substantially correlated with each other.  
Table 4: Correlations Matrix    
Variables EPS MBV LEV SIZE CGI 
EPS 1     
MBV .282** 1    
LEV .012 .017 1   
SIZE  -.176** -.223** .530** 1  
CGI .034 .015 .333** .399** 1 
DP is cash dividend over earnings. MBV is market to book value. LEVERGE is total debt to total 
asset. EPS is earnings per share equity. TOTAL ASSETS is book value of total assets. CGI is 
multifactor corporate governance Index 
The pair wise correlations between the explanatory variables are very low, suggesting that 
there is no multicollinearity problem among these variables. In order to get effective and corrective 
estimates the data should be free from autocorrelations and multicollinearity. The above mentioned 
tests have confirmed that the underlying data is best fitted for regression estimates.     
Table 5: OLS Regression Analysis 
Model Beta t-values Sig. 
(Constant)  .531 .596 
EPS .209 3.379 .001 
MBV -.276 -4.389 .000 
LEV -.028 -.399 .690 
SIZE  .095 1.241 .216 
CGI .131 2.007 .046 
R R Square Adjusted R Square  
.339 .143 .112  
DP is cash dividend over earnings. MBV is market to book value. LEVERGE is total debt to 
total asset. EPS is earnings per share equity. TOTAL ASSETS is book value of total assets.  
CGI is multifactor corporate governance Index 
Table 5 contains the results of regression estimates, it reveals that there is the positive 
relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance practices in Pakistan. It suggests the 
support of outcome model and consistent with the findings of (Sawicki, 2009).  In Pakistan, 
dividend policy moves with the direction of corporate governance standard, stronger the corporate 
governance higher will be the chances of paying dividends.  
Earnings is an important determinants of dividends, it has a positive significant relationship 
with dividend policy. It implies that more the firms are profitable higher will be the levels of 
dividends. The results of existing studies related to Pakistan have also confirmed the same positive 
relationship between dividend policy and profitability of firms (Ahmad & Javad, 2009). The market 
to book value ratio is the proxy of investment opportunities, which have a highly significant 
negative relationship with the dividend policy. When firms have potential investment opportunities 
managers prefer to retain cash to finance the investment opportunities instead of paying as dividends 
(Li Lin & Hua, 2012).  
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The leverage is negatively but insignificantly related with dividend policy. It shows that 
leverage is not significantly contributing in framing the dividend policy this result is consistent with 
other studies (Ahmad & Javad, 2009, Afza & Hassan, 2010). The size of the firm is a positive but 
insignificant determinant of dividend policy in Pakistan. It means that big firms use to pay more 
dividends as compare to small size firms because big firms have certain advantages over small firms 
like; better market access, easy and cheap credit availability, and so on (Naeem & Nasr, 2007).  The 
overall explanatory power of the model is weak which indicates that there are some other 
determining factors of dividend policy in Pakistan. 
Table 6: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 Coefficient p-value 
Const 5.87258 0.72242 
EPS 0.254788 0.00291 
MBV -2.65446 0.00004 
SIZE 2.1756 0.20558 
LEV -5.03882 0.59651 
CGI 3.95643 0.04540 
p-value 0.000023  
Chi- Square   
Log-likelihood 
29.03 
-1247.849 
  
Akaike criterion 2509.699  
DP is cash dividend over earnings. MBV is market to book value. LEVERGE is total debt to total 
asset. EPS is earnings per share equity. TOTAL ASSETS is book value of total assets. CGI is 
multifactor corporate governance Index. 
Table 6 presents the results of tobit regression model, which assumes that a company can 
only pay positive dividend or omit dividend. The Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach 
uses to calculate the coefficient of the variables. There is the similarity in results of OLS model and 
Tobit model, in both of these models profitability, investment opportunities and corporate 
governance are significantly affecting dividend policy. The signs of the coefficients are also the 
same in both of these regression models. The significant value of Chi Square Test (i.e. 96.52) rejects 
the null hypothesis that parameters in regression model are jointly equal to zero, the lower value of 
log likelihood ratio and higher value of akaike information criteria represents the significance and 
goodness of fit of model. Random effect Tobit model also confirms that corporate governance is 
very imperative while deciding about payment of dividends in Pakistan. Companies’ dividend policy 
moves with the direction corporate governance, better the governance level in firm higher are the 
chances to pay dividends.          
Conclusion 
The study intended to investigate the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
dividend policy in Pakistan. How corporate governance quality affects the decision of dividend 
payments in Pakistan.The study has investigated Karachi Stock Exchange 100 index listed 
companies from 2008 to 2011. Based in agency theory, this study offers a test for two competing 
hypotheses about the relationship between governance quality and dividend policy. First, the 
Outcome model proposes that better governed firms should have to pay higher dividends by pursing 
shareholders rights. Second, the Substitution hypothesis narrates that dividends are the substitution 
for governance quality and weak governed firms use to pay higher dividend in to order to establish 
good repute in the market. An empirical evidence established that dividend policy positively related 
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with corporate governance practices. It means that better governed firms use to pay more dividends 
and confirming the support of outcome model in Pakistan. It has also been established that corporate 
governance is an important determinant of dividend policy in Pakistan. It implies that the protection 
of shareholders rights is improving with the passage of time after the implementation of corporate 
governance code in 2003. The traditional control variables such as profitability and investment 
opportunities have substantial role in determining the dividend policy in Pakistan. Profitable firms 
turn to pay more dividends when they have few investment opportunities to invest. The priority of 
firms in Pakistan is to keep the money retain to finance the investment opportunities instead of 
disposing off as dividends to shareholders. The study contributes effectively on the verge of 
research, explaining the role of corporate governance in defining the dividend policy of a company. 
Especially, the results of this study establish that effective corporate governance mechanisms reduce 
agency problems and squeeze the managers’ opportunistic behavior in dividend policy. These 
findings may be useful to Pakistani regulators seeking to establish effective rules to prevent 
management exploitations.  It is the pioneer study with respect to Pakistan which has investigated 
the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy by constructing proper corporate governance 
firm level index to probe the empirical contribution of corporate governance in forming the dividend 
policy. The scope of the study is limited to four years data from 2008 to 2011 and enclosing just 
Karachi Stock Exchange 100 index listed companies.  The results of this study can be cemented 
further by enlarging sample size, period and splitting firms into financial and non- financial firms.  
An extension of this paper would examine the relationship between a firm’s overall governance 
quality and other financial and strategic decisions such as debt financing and so on.   
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